Journal of Book of Mormon Studies
Volume 26

Number 1

Article 10

2017

"Virtue" in Moroni 9:9
Jason A. Kerr

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/jbms

BYU ScholarsArchive Citation
Kerr, Jason A. (2017) ""Virtue" in Moroni 9:9," Journal of Book of Mormon Studies: Vol. 26: No. 1, Article
10.
Available at: https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/jbms/vol26/iss1/10

This Notes and Communications is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at BYU
ScholarsArchive. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Book of Mormon Studies by an authorized editor
of BYU ScholarsArchive. For more information, please contact ellen_amatangelo@byu.edu.

Notes
"Virtue" in Moroni 9:9
Jason A. Kerr
LATTER-DAY SAINT mscuss10Ns

OF

CHASTITY often include Moroni

9:9 because of its suggestion that "chastity and virtue" constitute "that

which is most dear and precious above all things:' The verse also says,
however, that people can be "deprived" of chastity and virtue by the
violence of rape. For the prophet Mormon, the Nephites' actions in
Moriantum exceed "this great abomination of the Lamanites;' which
involved "feed[ing] the women upon the flesh of their husbands, and
the children upon the flesh of their fathers" (Moroni 9:8). Mormon's
strong language aims to condemn the rapists, not their victims. Using
the verse to teach about chastity, though, invites interpretation from the
perspective of the victims, which raises the question of what it means to
understand chastity and virtue as something of which a person can be
deprived, passively, by another. 1 Such passive loss of virtue runs strongly
contrary to LDS teaching about agency, including those rooted in Book
of Mormon passages like 2 Nephi 2, with the consequence that victims
of sexual abuse or assault can be made to feel guilty for sins that are
not their own.

1. As of25 September 2016, Moroni 9:9 no longer appears in the chapter on virtue
in the online version of the Young Women Personal Progress booklet, a salutary change
that undercuts some of the harmful ideas discussed in this note. See https:/ /www.lds
.org/young-women/personal-progress/virtue?lang=eng
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In trying to understand a worldview in which it makes sense to say
that virtue can be taken away, the Roman story of the Rape of Lucretia
provides a useful intertext, and this note will examine that story to show
the implications of using Moroni 9:9 to teach about chastity. I am not
proposing that the Lucretia story influenced the verse in Moroni; rather,
I am using it to illustrate the pitfalls of interpreting that verse as LDS
discussions of chastity often do.
This note will focus on virtue, treating it as a synonym for chastity
on the basis of popular tendencies to read the text's "chastity and virtue"
as a hendiadys, even though virtue is better understood as a category
of moral goods, with chastity as a subset. Other scriptural uses support this latter understanding. For instance, in Proverbs 31:10, "virtuous" renders a form of the Hebrew chayil, which indicates strength
or ability rather than sexual purity, even though the verse gets used
alongside Moroni 9:9 in discussions of chastity. Similarly, in the three
passages from the Gospels where Jesus describes virtue going out of
him (Mark 5:30; Luke 6: 19; 8:46), "virtue'' translates forms of the Greek
dynamis, which denotes power or energy, rather than anything having
to do with sexuality per se.
The Rape of Lucretia affords a good platform for understanding the
idea that virtue can be taken away. The Book of Mormon itself provides
a rather slender basis for understanding the sexual mores of its culture:
the sermon in Jacob 2, the people of Noah's proffering their daughters to appease a Lamanite army, the subsequent rape of the Lamanite
daughters by the priests of Noah, Alma's talk with Corianton, and the
verse in Moroni. With the possible exception of Jacob's sermon, none
of these episodes understands women in terms other than as sexual
objects for men. Consequently, the Book of Mormon affords few to no
opportunities for thinking about female sexual agency in positive terms.
The Lucretia story provides an apt analogue in part for linguistic
reasons. The nearest translation to the original language of the Book of
Mormon is in English, and the word virtue sends us back to the Latin,
where it comes from the word vir, meaning "man'' (in the male sense,
not the generically human sense). Associating virtue with masculinity
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raises complex questions of gender, given that the people deprived of
it in Moroni 9:9 were women. What might it mean for women to have
this masculine trait in the first place? That requires looking at Roman
sexual mores, which center on the concepts of pudicitia, or the proper
inviolability of any freeborn Roman (male or female), and stuprum, or
the violation of pudicitia. 2
Even though both men and women can have pudicitia, a gendered
difference remains. As Craig Williams explains, "According to the prime
directive of masculine sexual behavior, a Roman man who wished to
retain his claim to full masculinity must always be thought to play the
insertive role in penetrative acts, whether with males or females; if he
was thought to have sought the receptive role in such acts he was liable
to being mocked as effeminate:' 3 Thus, Roman virtue-acting like a
man-depends on "control and dominion, both of others and of oneself."4
Enter Lucretia, whose story appears in Livy's history of Rome and in
the section of Ovid's Fasti for 24 February, titled "Regifugium:' Rome in
its early days was governed by kings, the Tarquins. One king, Tarquinius
Superbus (Tarquin the Proud) had a son, Sextus Tarquinius. Sextus,
after seeing Lucretia, the wife of his kinsman Lucius Tarquinius Collatinus, decided to rape her. She resisted until Sextus threatened to kill
both Lucretia and a slave and leave them naked together in the bed,
suggesting in Livy's words "adultery of the lowest kind [sordido adulterio] ;' at which point "his lust prevailed as the victor over her resolute
chastity [vicisset obstinatam pudicitiam velut victrix libido] :'s
Livy's language presents the pre-rape as a debate in which Sextus prevailed by making an argument that Lucretia could not counter.
Chastity, in these terms, is a form of eloquence, and Lucretia's proved
insufficient. (Never mind that Tarquin relied on a threat of violence
2. Craig A. Williams, Roman Homosexuality, 2nd ed. ( Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2010), 104-9.
3. Williams, Roman Homosexuality, 137.
4. Williams, Roman Homosexuality, 139.
5. Livy, The History of Rome: Books 1-5, trans. Valerie M. Warrior (Indianapolis:
Hackett, 2006), 80. Livy, Titi Livi Ab Urbe Condita, ed. Robert Seymour Conway and
Charles Flamstead Walters (Oxford: Clarendon, 1966), I.58.5.
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and not reason alone.) The contest was one of virtue, understood in
masculine terms of dominance. It ended when one party forced the
other to assume the feminine position, which in this case fell to Lucretia. The debate was a test designed to evaluate whether or not Lucretia
truly possessed chastity, understood as the impenetrability of pudicitia.
Tarquin, in other words, took away her claim to masculine virtue, which
Ovid explicitly assigns her when he describes her as a "matron of manly
courage [animi matrona virilis] :'6 She failed to control what happened
to her body, which means she could not possibly have virtue.
The chilling consequence of understanding the contest as a debate
is that it ended in Lucretia's consent. "Consent" comes from the Latin
verb consentire, which means "thinking or feeling with:' In other
words, when Lucretia could not come up with an argument to counter
Tarquin's threat, she is understood as having agreed with his reasoning.
Faced with the prospect of murder and implied adultery, she agreed
to be raped, and the very fact of her having been penetrated suggests
that her chastity was never all she made it out to be. (To be clear: I am
explaining this, not approving it.)
The next day, Lucretia called her husband and father, accompanied by another kinsman, Lucius Junius Brutus, to her chamber and
explained what happened. In Roman understandings of the family, the
paterfamilias acted as a judge over his household, so Lucretia was submitting herself to a kind of family court, in part because the rape was
an affront against Collatinus's pudicitia, too, because his household had
been penetrated. Collatinus and Brutus concluded that she was not at
fault in what happened. She, however, refused the pardon and killed
herself. In Livy's version, she sets herself up as a moral martyr, refusing
to allow that her example might excuse future adultery. In Ovid's version, she seems driven by posttraumatic despair.
Augustine, writing about this story in The City of God, identifies
Lucretia's double bind: "If she is adulterous, why is she praised? If
chaste, why was she put to death [si adulterata, cur laudata; si pudica,
6. Ovid, Fasti, ed. Sir James George Frazer (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1926), 118-19 (line 847).
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cur occisa] ?" 7 The tension emerges because, on the one hand, it was
clear that Tarquin forced Lucretia against her will, but, on the other,
the powerful cultural assumption that chastity means invulnerability to
unwanted penetration casts an inevitable shadow on Lucretia's character. She killed herself either as a way of trying to throw the shadow off
(Livy) or out of despairing resignation to it (Ovid). Lucretia is the paradigmatic example of the mindset that thinks death preferable to unchastity (and expressions of that idea in late twentieth-century Latter-day
Saint discourse are not hard to find).
I am not suggesting that these assumptions are normative in Mormonism. The Family Proclamation, with its talk of equal partners in
marriage, is probably irreconcilable with Roman family values, and the
only people who go around thinking in terms of pudicitia and stuprum
are classics professors. They, of all people, are in a position to recognize
the distance between those ideas and modern life.
Even so, I think that church members import those assumptions
whenever they suggest that virtue can be passively taken away. When
they make these assumptions, they frame masculinity in terms of domination (contrary to Doctrine and Covenants 121) and deny women
full access to the agency that is near the heart of LDS theology. More
troublingly, this may imply that rape victims, by the mere fact of having
been raped, cannot be chaste, because they must have consented in
some way, whether by dressing a certain way, by staying out past curfew,
or simply by having been penetrated at all. This mindset can suggest
to both victims and their ecclesiastical leaders a need for confession
and repentance when the situation more properly calls for reassurance
that the victim has not sinned, together with the gentle work of finding
healing through a loving Savior.
Certainly Mormon, in writing about the experience of these women,
only meant to deplore what happened. He was focused on the negative
effects of male agency, not on anything having to do with female agency,
with the possibly unintended consequence of treating women as wholly
7. Augustine, The City of God I.19, trans. Henry Bettenson (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972), 30. Latin from the Brepols Library of Latin Texts-Series A.
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passive victims. Reading the verse as an admonition to female chastity
assumes an agency that the text does not grant and does so in a way that
imputes to women the blame for male actions. Such a reading does not
comport with the powerful teachings on agency elsewhere in the Book
of Mormon, and we would do well to look there, rather than to Moroni
9:9, in our thinking about female sexual agency.
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of Rape.

